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'UNDERDEVELOPMENT' AND CHEAP LABOUR SUPPLIES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1923 - 1953
- A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK -
Any study which seeks to explore the causes of *underdevelopment1 in a
colonial or ex-colonial territory, is bound to be confronted with the
challenge of deciding where capitalism stands in relation to the problem.
Stated in unambiguous terms, the basic issue which analysts have been trying
to resolve is whether capitalism is fundamentally beneficial or harmful to a
developing country.
Those who assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that capitalism is a
positive force, postulate a kind of 'dualism' generally associated with
the 'cultural pluralists1 (1). Within this dualist framework, 'under-
development1 becomes synonomous with an 'original' condition of low-product-
ivity 'subsistence', based on outmoded traditional practices which are
progressively 'modernized' through increasing contact with a more dynamic
capitalist sector, the initial contact being seen to occur through the
voluntary migration of workers from the 'subsistence' to the capitalist
sector (2).
The 'dualist' frame of reference also influences the manner in which the
'liberal capitalist1 school perceives the problem. For if, despite the
increasing contact with the capitalist or 'money' sector the indigenous
economy fails to develop, then according to this school of thought, the
causes can be found in certain restrictive practices, flowing from racial
discrimination, which create 'blockages' and 'income inequalities', as
detrimental to capitalist growth in the long tejpn, as they are to the sub-
sistence economy in the short term (3). Implicit in this approach, is the
notion that the solution to 'underdevelopment' involves no structural changes,
merely requiring political changes (i.e. the removal of racial restrictions)
in order for the economic benefits of capitalism to permeate more effect-
ively through the social structure, to the advantage of all.
It has been left to Marxist scholars, using empirical evidence to try and
show that there is indeed a structural connection, or causal relationship
between discrimination and capitalism? that discrimination and capitalist
growth have been perfectly compatible; and indeed, that the technological,
economic and political 'distance' between colonizers and the colonized was
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less an 'original' state, than it was the outcome of capitalism itself.
Notable among these is Giovanni Arrighi who shows how, in the Rhodesian
instance, rising subsistence needs of African rural dwellers (through dest-
ruction of indigenous handicraft industries and increasing reliance on
European goods), declining crop yields (through enforced movement of
Africans into less fertile and remote 'Reserves1), falling crop prices "
(through progressive curtailment of African competition in the grain
market), along with compulsory payments (like poll tax, dipping fees etc.),
all had the effect of reducing the pre-capitalist sector to a state of
dependency on the capitalist sector. Such dependency, Arrighi argues,
was reflected by the 'necessary'(rather than 'voluntary1) participation of
Africans in the capitalist sector, indicating certain 'structural changes'
in the economy which enabled the capitalist sector to employ labour at
below-subsistence wage "levels, and by this means, grow at the pre-capitalist
J sector's expense (4).
Arrighi, however, stretches his conclusion too far. For even if it can
be shown that capitalist growth coincides with pre-capitalist underdevelop-
ment1 Cundevelopment1 may be better description), this is no justification
for claiming that capitalism itself is the cause of such 'underdevelopment1
(or "undevelopment). For clearly, there is a difference between the non-
economic discriminatory measures - Arrighi calls them 'non-market mechanisms"
(5) - which create the state of dependency, and the economic forces of capi-
talism which benefit from, but are not in themselves the original cause of
such dependency. Otherwise stated, dependency in the Arrighian frame of
reference, has a non-economic, and not economic origin.
The flaw in Arrighi Ks perception is that he manages to see only one structural
•\ connection between exploiters and exploited, notably the super-exploitation
of labour. Though this is thoroughly within tEe Marxist tradition, the
inevitable consequence of such a one-dimensional, labour-orientated view of
/
the connection between the pre-capitalist and capitalist sectors, is to /
* /
regard the fbackward* or 'exploited' sector as a single amorphous entity
(the prime, indeed sole, function of which is to supply cheap labour), and
to measure the 'contraints1 or 'squeeze' placed on the indigenous sector in
terms of the latterfs 'separation1 from, or •denial of access1 to the modern
markets, modes of transport, and superior technology available to the capi-
talist sector. Thus, Arrighi merely serves to deepen the dualism he is
trying to explain away - by, for instance, stressing that such discriminatory
measures as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, and the Maize Control Acts
of the Great Depression period in Rhodesia sought to create "the division
of the economy into non-competing racial groups" (6).
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The same emphasis on the 'separation1 of the two sectors is implicit in
Brett's study, in which he sets up peasant production and capitalistic
settler production as "sharply antagonistic modes" (7) , and in which he
forwards the notion that the "plantation structure" in Kenya produced "a
subsistence sector disconnected from the market" (8).
We are thus presented with a capitalism which flourishes, not .through a
process of domination, but of exclusion; not by removing 'dualism' in order
to facilitate more effective exploitation, but by accentuating it. In this
context, 'underdevelopment' (or undevelopment1) is not so much the conse-
quence of capitalist penetration, but of a type of dualist 'separation' not
very different from that put forward by the liberal capitalist school.
This is not to deny Arrighifs very real contribution in revealing the
compatability between racial discrimination and capitalism (in contrast to
the 'incompatability' stressed by the liberal capitalists). But, in fail-
ing to come to proper grips with 'dualism', he falls short of establishing
how capitalism itself can cause 'underdevelopment'.
One way out of this difficulty is to see, as Frank does, capitalism pene-
trating into every corner of the indigenous economy, and totally integrating
the latter into the capitalist structure, specifically through the medium of
trade or 'commercial capitalism' which, by means of 'unequal exchange', is
able to siphon off surplus value from the less advanced sector, and in this
way, create the dependency of one sector on the other (9). On the basis of
this argument, the indigenous sector becomes capitalist1 from the moment it
is penetrated by the merchant, so that, in Frank's eyes, the distinction
between 'capitalist1 and 'non-capitalist1 becomes meaningless.
As Laclau shows, however, fcapitalism' in Marx's meaning of the term, is a
mode of production which, by definition, excludes 'merchant capital1 (10),
or what Frank calls 'commercial capitalism1. And as Bettelheim has shown,
even 'unequal exchange' is merely the symptom of "the inequality of develop-
ment of the productive forces" of the parties involved in the exchange (11) .
If we are going to prove, therefore, that capitalism causes underdevelopment,
we would need to look at the manner in which modes of production - capitalist
and pre-capitalist - interact with one another; how the capitalist mode
penetrates into the pre-capitalist mode to form horizontal ties and alliances /
which maintain the exploitative structure as a whole; and how production in
the pre-capitalist is geared and channelled to the advantage of the capitalist.
This, in turn, means taking a radically different view of the colonial
state's role, which must be measured not only in terms of 'separatist'
techniques (i.e. elimination and land and crop competition) needed to secure
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the base for capitalism, but also in terms of moves towards re-integrating
the two sectors, in order to sustain capitalist growth.
Even as one traces the interaction between the two sectors, the careful
distinction which Marx makes between the process of capital accumulation
preceding capitalism (i.e. 'primitive accumulation1), and the capitalistic
mode of production itself, would also have to be noted. On this basis,
'primitive accumulation1 would embrace both the acquisition of capital
through trading (i.e. Frank's 'commercial capitalism1 or Laclau's
'merchant capital1) , and dispossession of the peasantry of certain capital
claims through the denial of sufficient land and easy access to markets,
and through the state's use of coercive measures (as shown by Arrighi) •
The capitalistic mode of production, on the other hand, comes to embrace
the utilization of both^the capital thus accumulated, and the labour-power
*x of the dispossessed peasantry, with the specific aim of producing 'surplus
value' in its own right.
Moreover, as Dobb shows (12) , capitalism as Marx defined it, is not simply
a system of production for the market, but a system under which labour-
power "itself becomes a commodity" i.e. where work for the capitalist
producer becomes the only source of livelihood for the labourer. Capitalism,
in this context, only comes into operation after the person selling his
labour-services has been deprived of his own means of production or subsis-
tence, and thus cannot be held responsible for that deprivation, and the
lack of development which follows in its wake.
Now if, despite these conceptual difficulties, one still wishes to argue
that the "modernity" of the capitalist sector is a "function of the back-
wardness" of the pre-capitalist sector (13) , then one is forced to postulate
J a mode of production which links the 'priraitive^ccumulation' process to the
capitalistic mode of production by containing, within itself, the elements
of both i.e. a production mode which both appropriates capital at the pre-
capitalist sector1s expense, and employs wage labour in a capitalistic-
type endeavour.
In the colonial situation, such a link comes to be provided by the White
settler farming mode - or what Laclau identifies as "the feudal mode" or
"agrarian capitalism" (14). Such a mode can be described as 'feudal1 in
character in the sense of :
(a) concentrating the ownership of property into its own hands, S
at the expense of the peasantry; while /
(b) siphoning off surpluses from the peasant sectors; while
(c) increasing servile obligations which turn peasants into
serfs; thus
(d) unleashing a 'primitive accumulation1 process which dissolves
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the old order and strengthens the base for capitalist endeavour.
On the other hand. White settler agriculture can be seen as 'capitalist1 in
the sense of :
(a) transforming serfs into full-time labourers, notably by changing
tenant-landlord agreements into wage-labour agreements; and
(b) utilizing the capital it has accumulated for the large-scale
production of commodities (principally for export markets) ;
while
(c) seeking to conserve those elements of pre-capitalist production
which contribute to cheap labour and which help to keep down
production costs.
In forwarding this notion of 'feudalism1 with 'capitalist' objectives, we
are not suggesting that feudalism everywhere leads to capitalism. As the
Russian Revolution bears out, nothing is inevitable in history. Nor need
it have been inevitable in the British case. But, given the role of the
colonial state in backing these capitalistic objectives, and given also,
that colonization, in the Rhodesian case, was carried out through the medium
of the B.S.A. Company, with undisguised capitalist intentions of finding a
'Second Witwatersrand1 (15), occurring at a stage when capitalism in the
Mother Country was already in full flower, there can be no doubting the
direction in which feudalism was headed.
Even so, one must resist the temptation of linking the B.S.A. Company into
a vertical chain of capitalism, stretching from London and Cape Town to
Rhodesia, which automatically incorporated pre-capitalist Ndebele and Shona
communities into a world system of capitalism* Such a link did undoubtedly
exist, but the incorporation of these African communities into an international
system of capitalist domination was by no means automatic.
It was the distinctive feature of colonial penetration into Rhodesia, for
instance, that the settlers who came there brought very little capital with
them, and precious little capitalist know-how. As miners, they carried out
essentially small-scale operations, generally on borrowed equipment (16);
and when disillusionment with mining forced them into agriculture, they were
initially little more than "subsistence cultivators indistinguishable., from
the African peasantry around them" (17). This meant that capital had to
be raised internally through the process of 'primitive accumulation1 pre-
viously described, and that internal structures of domination had first to be
established before the link-up with world capitalism - notably through the
export market - could occur.
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Once this 'internal accumulation' got underway, the settlers could oppose,
with growing confidence, the BSA Company's monopolistic stranglehold, by
putting successful pressure on the Imperial Government to deprive the Company
of its ownership of unalienated land in 1918 (18) ; by winning control of the
Company's railway interests through the establishment of a Railways Commission
in 1925 (19); by gaining responsible government in 1923 (20); and finally,
by securing the Company's mineral rights in 1933(21).
The fact that capitalism can acquire an internal momentum of its own, should
stand as a warning against the temptation of perceiving • underdevelopment1 in
terms of one 'country' exploiting another 'country1, or even one 'race' /
another 'race'. For as Bill Warren hints (22) and Bettelheim shows (23),
capitalism is more a 'class' phenomenon than an international or racial one.
Just as White settlers jLn Rhodesia emerged as a distinct capitalist •class1,
x so too was an independent 'class' of African 'master farmers' allowed to
emerge in the African sector, thereby creating horizontal ties with the
more advanced European sector, and so helping to sustain the 'dependency'
relationship.
Indeed, the crux of that 'dependency' relationship in the Rhodesian case,
was the colonial state's encouragement of African crop production which did
not compete with European production, but was nevertheless needed by Europeans
for keeping down their own production costs, and which sometimes contributed
to overall national growth in areas of the export market which was con-
sidered too risky for Europeans to enter. The colonial state's role, in
this context, was therefore not only one of 'dissolution', but also on
'conservation'.
It is precisely the importance of 'conservation' which has been totally
) overlooked by Arrighi, Brett et al. And yet, ^ ^conservation' is necessary,
not only to ensure a supply of cheap foods, but also a continued supply of
cheap labour.
For instance: it is the essence of feudal capitalism in a colonial situa-
tion that it exploits the peasant sector by employing labour at below the
cost of its own reproduction i.e. below the cost of subsistence necessary
to support both the labourer and his family. As Marx shows, family sub-
sistence becomes necessary so that the labourer's children may perpetuate
the supply of labour in the market (24). Since it is precisely this cost
which the feudal capitalist fails to meet, it becomes necessary for the
state to conserve the rural base on which the peasant family relies for
its subsistence, while the worker is away.
But it is not 'conservation' in the sense that Wolpe (25) means it i.e. the
total exclusion of capital from the African areas in order to preserve these
in their pristine traditional form. For, with the introduction of cash
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obligations into the pre-capitalist sector (through trading operations, and
with the introduction of poll tax, dog tax, transport charges, levies, and
the like) , it becomes necessary for the peasantry to meet at least part of
these obligations through the production of cash-crop surpluses, over and .
above subsistence production. For this reason, at least some intrusion
of capital and capitalism into the pre-capitalist sector, albeit on a care-
fully controlled scale, becomes necessary sooner or later. The problem then
becomes one of what to do with the cash crops so produced, and the challenge
one of channelling supplies and controlling prices in such a manner that
African production works to the benefit of, and not to the detriment, of
White feudal capitalism.
Obviously, in meeting the requirements of feudal capitalism in various
stages of its growth, and in reconciling the conflicting demands of various
modes of feudal production (such as the ranching, crop-producing, small-
* scale farming, and large-scale plantation modes), the state*s policy must
be carefully orchestrated to tune in with an ever-changing situation.
If the demand is for capital claims, then policy will tend towards 'dissolu-
tion1; if the challenge lies in maintaining growth, then the emphasis will
tend to shift towards 'conservation' and 'rationalization.
We thus arrive at Bettlheim's description which holds that:
" ...within a capitalist formation, the non-capitalist forms
of production, before they disappear, are restructured (partly
dissolved) and thus subordinated to the predominant capitalist
relations (and so conserved)11 (26).
Because there is a process of conservation involved, Cardoso's notion of
'dependent development' (27) perhaps comes closest to describing the con-
dition which Marxists call 'underdevelopment1.
\ To sum up thus far, the processes involved in the creation of a state of
'underdevelopment1 may be categorised as follows:
(i) There is a process involving the initial accumulation of
capital and capital claims through land seizures, plunder,
trading speculation, and barter, (which can be referred to
as EXPROPRIATION)
(ii) there is a process involving extra-economic pressure in the
form of cash obligations, labour recruitment, service con-
tracts etc., designed to extract cheap labour from the
peasantry; (COERCION)
(iii) there is a process of pre-capitalist disintegration and
adaptation, in response to the forces of 'primitive accumula-
tion', which weakens the pre-capitalist sector and makes it
dependent on the capitalist; (DISSOLUTION)
(iv) there is a process whereby 'primitive accumulation' is
rationalized and integrated by the state into an overall
system of exploitation, in order to reconcile conflicting
demands by various modes of feudal capitalism; (REINTEGRATION)
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(v) there is a process of preserving the rural subsistence
base to ensure a form of 'dependent development' beneficial
to feudal capitalism and to the economy as a whole
(CONSERVATION)
(vi) there is, finally, a process whereby efficient peasant pro-
ducers are separated out from the less efficient, and the
latter from dispossessed or partly dispossessed (marginalized)
peasantry, thereby creating horizontal relationships which
help to sustain and maintain the overall exploitative
structure; (DIFFERENTIATION).
While these processes obviously interact, it seems necessary to define them
separately, in order to distinguish between those which help to secure the
base capitalistic exploitation (expropriation, coercion, and dissolution),
and those which help to sustain the exploitative structure as a whole and
ensure its continuity (reintegration, conservation, and differentiation). -
Through all them, however, the manner in which capitalist-inspired deci-
-x sions influenced the peasant sector remains a constant theme, and it is
this aspect which emerges with some clarity, when analyzing the Rhodesian
experience.
In summarizing the process of expropriation, for instance, there can be
no denying the commercial nature of Rhodesia's occupation by Whites and
the close association with international capitalism of the period. The
1893 War, which saw the Ndbele deprived of most of their land and cattle,
was partly engineered to arrest the fall of the BSA Company's shares on
the London Stock Exchange (28). Of some 15,8m acres of land thus expro-
priated, some 9,3m acres were passed over into the hands of companies
formed by Rhodes' well-connected friends. Of the 200,000 head of cattle
in Ndbele hands prior to 1893, the Company laid claim to 125,470 after
the war, about half going to itself, and the other half to officers and
. J men who had fought against the Ndbele. (29) These confiscations laid
the basis for a future ranching industry.
The expropriation of land at African expense continued intermitently until
1902, when the Imperial Government saw fit to reserve about 20m acres
throughout Rhodesia for Africans who wanted to live in tribal society,
while nevertheless guaranteeing Africans the right to acquire land indi-
vidually, on the same footing as Whites, if they so wished (30). ^-""
But while in theory Africans had the same chance of individual property
ownership as Whites, the Company's decision to promote commercial farming
in 1906, to compensate for mining's lack of promise, held out three
important implications:
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(a) First, its decision placed a commercial value on land, which,
initially, was sold off very cheaply - at S^d per acre for ranching
and 3s.9d. per acre for crop land (31) - to aspirant farmers, the
majority of whom purchased their farms on capital borrowed from the
Land Bank, established in 1909.
With Africans being denied similar access to Land Bank loans, and
with the average land price being allowed to float upwards to
7/- per acre by 1920 (32), the chances of Africans owning their own
land on an individual basis were therefore progressively reduced.
The process of excluding Africans in this way, finds its equivalent
in Marx's description of the role of property in 'primitive accumula-
tion1 » when he explains that what was chiefly necessary as the
historical agency^of the accumulation of wealth in bourgeoise hands,
A was some influence which would depress the value of whatever happened
to be the object of hoarding by the bourgeoise during the phase of
acquisition, and increase its relative value during the phase of
realization. (33).
(b) The second repercussion to flow from the decision to embark on
agrarian production, was the imposition of rentals, grazing fees,
and dipping charges on the peasantry living on unalienated and
alienated European land. These exactions became necessary both to
increase the labour supply (34) and (perhaps more significant) to
raise capital for meeting the purchase price of the farm. (35)
(c) The decision also influenced the 1925 Land Commission in its
allocation of land for African and European ownership. Because of
\ the preference for binding African tenants to European landlords,
for reasons noted above, the Commission deliberately avoided a
'segregation' solution by deciding not to provide Reserves in
Matabeleland. Instead, it decided to create African purchase
areas elsewhere, so as to absorb those Africans who would not be
needed on European land, and to provide "a nearby source of compa-
ratively skilled labour" (36). And finally in order to ensure that
there would be enough land available for the future growth of
European agriculture, the Commission decided to allocate 72 per cent
(i.e. 17.42m acres) of available land to Europeans, on the under-
standing that if commercial farming was unsuccessful, the Whites
would be anxious to sell to Africans and the law could be amended (37)
Because of settlers' economic needs, total segregation of Africans and
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Europeans was never the intention, either of the 1925 Land Commissioners, or
the promulgators of the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. As Prime Minister,
H. U. Moffat, argued when introducing the 1929 Bill on the latter, "total
segregation would have implied an intention and an objective to remove all
Africans to the Reserves ... but this is not the intention, either in the /
short or long run" (37). Nor was the 1930 Act concerned with 'reserving1'
separate areas for Africans, in order to protect them from European competi-
tion: as Rifkind shows (38), the need for 'reserves1 had already been
established under the 1898 Order in Council, while the reserve areas them-
selves were entrenched in the 1923 Constitution. What the 1930 Act was
concerned with, was 'protecting' European land rights and determining the
conditions under which Africans could be allowed to occupy land in European
areas. Thus, out of 76 provisions in the Act (excluding the 'miscellaneous'
^ section) , no less than 43 were directly concerned with stating these condi-
tions. As such, the Act merely entrenched the system whereby the bulk
of the burden imposed by the accumulation of capital in White hands fell,
not on Africans living in the Reserves, but on those living on European
and Crown lands.
For instance: a comparison made in 1923 revealed that, whereas an African
peasant living inside the Reserve could expect to pay £2.10.0. per annum
in poll tax, dog tax, and dipping fees etc., his compatriot outside the
Reserve could pay £5.5.0 per annum or more. Moreover, whereas the Reserve
peasant could expect some reimbursement on his contributions in the form of
state expenditure.on development, conservation and extension programmes,
the peasant outside received back exactly nil (39). The result was that
non-Reserve peasants were the first to offer their services as full-time
) labourers for Europeans, while Reserve peasants were able to resist this
the longest. ,--''
In the latter regard, provisional calculations based on figures given in
Native Commissioner annual reports suggested that the highest labour
migration rates (of over 50 per cent of able-bodied males in 1945-46) were
recorded in such predominantly Europe an-occupied districts as Inyanga and
Sipolilo, while the lowest rates (of below 10 per cent) were shown by
remote reserves of the Gwanda, Ndanga, Bulalima-Mangwe, Belingwe, Bikita
and Nuanetsi districts.
Much more work needs to be done to establish the broad trends in African
labour migration. But already it is becoming obvious that the Arrighian
connection between increased segregation and increased labour migration is
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in need of some revision.
This is not to deny that the 'segregated1 reserve areas were also expected
to supply cheap labour. The process of coercion,identified on page 10 and
more than adequately discussed by van Onselen, Mackenzie, Steele e£ al (40) ,
testifies to this. What is often ignored, however, is that in addition
to labour, African-grown produce from the reserves not only represented
cheap farming input costs for European producers (as discussed earlier),
but also an important source of capital accumulation by European traders,
who acted as middlemen in the African maize trade.
Thus, African-grown maize could be bought for 10/- a bag by traders in the
Charter area, and resold in Salisbury and Hartley at 37/6; maize acquired
in Victoria district at 12/- a bag could be resold for about 25/- in the
township itself, and for^  50/- to 60/- to mines in the Selukwe area. One
•~\ way of extracting the maximum profit from peasants was to offer only trade
goods and refuse to pay cash for maize, thus enabling traders to make what
in effect amounted to a 'double profit'. Many farmers, in order to
supplement their fanning incomes, also set themselves up as traders: or
moved into the business of cattle speculation, by buying up African cattle
in times of drought and disease, or simply seizing African stock trespassing
on their lands, and reselling these at a profit after fattening them up.(41).
The forces of expropriation and coercion from part of a general ensemble of
direct and indirect pressures which altered traditional agricultural practices
and weakened the peasantry's subsistence base, through a process of dissolu-
tion. Not least among these, was the dissolving impact of European crop
production itself, the consequences of which may be summarized as follows:
(i) As European crop production began to expand at a faster rate
* than export markets could absorb it, forcing down local prices
between 1908 and 1920 (42) , the African peasantry responded by
increasing their own crop acreages, merely in order to maintain
the same level of incomes (43). This, in turn, led to the increasing
use of ploughs, and a gradual departure from the traditional method
of cultivating with hoes. The change was not always for the better.
For, whereas the use of the hoe entailed some regard for the ecology ^
(i.e. the top soil was ridged in order to protect crops from flooding,
while trees were retained so that there branches could be burned for
fertilizer ash), the use of the plough involved no such concern (i.e.
trees were stumped, and plough lines failed to follow contours).
The result was that the yield from a ploughed land was often only
half that from hoe-prepared land, especially in very rainy seasons (44).
Even so, the plough enabled more land to be put under cultivation,
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more quickly, and on balance, ensured increased production - but at
the expense of land availability.
(ii) Increased acreages, in turn, put pressure on the amount of
grazing land available, leading to overstocking (45).
(iii) Acreage expansion also upset the ratio of arable to grazing
land, reduced the amount of manure available for fertilizing, and
thus contributed to declining yields (46).
(iv) Pressure on grazing land; along with compulsory dipping; and
the constant and often unnecessary enforcement of quarantine
regulations in the reserves, to isolate hardier and better adapted
African stock from disease-prone European cattle, cross-bred with
foreign stock, led to the overconcentration of African stock in
certain areas, and therefore a decline in their condition which,
"x in turn, lowered stock prices. To compensate for these lower
prices, Africans simply increased their crop acreages, thereby
completing the vicious circle (47).
(v) The more efficient use of African labour on European farms,
and consequent eviction of surplus squatters, led to population
movements into the reserves, which merely aggravated the problems
of overstocking and declining yields (48), to produce a vicious and
expanding circle of destruction (49).
(vi) Declining yields, overstocking, low prices, and overcrowding in
some reserves, in turn produced a rising spiral of rural poverty
which, in its turn, led to Africans pledging their future crops
and cattle to traders, and thus to rising indebtedness which simply
aggravated that poverty, and put pressure on the peasantry to offer
) their services as labourers(50).
The situation arose, therefore, where increased African crop production,
necessary for meeting cash and tax obligations, coincided with the growing
inability of the peasantry to meet even basic subsistence needs. Despite
this, European farmers found themselves in the anomolous position of
suffering from periodic labour shortages, due to the peasantry's own commit-
ments at times of planting and harvesting, and to the African preference for
earning tax and rent monies by working in towns and on larger mines, where
wages were higher (51)•
On top of all this, when the Great Depression broke, shattering European
agriculture's export base, European farmers started pressing for a return
large enough for them to continue farming and live according to 'civilized
standards' (52)
The government attempted to meet these problems by an elaborate set of
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conservation and rationalization measures which took the following forms:
(i) To help solve the labour shortage problem on the farms, it made
provision under the 193O Land Apportionment Act for farmers to
enter into firm 'labour agreements1 with their tenants, and to
get rid of excess squatters on their land. However, since the
reserves were clearly incapable of absorbing all the surplus
population due for eviction, the process could only be a gradual
one (53). In those instances where removals went ahead, the
Native Purchase Areas, adjoining the European Areas, tended to be
used as dumping grounds (54). The effect was to restrict, even
further, the opportunities for individual Africans to own property,
since leasehold had to be introduced in a number of purchase areas
to allow groups, rather than individuals, to occupy the land (55).
"\ (ii) To raise the carrying capacity of the reserves, and to guarantee
peasants at least a subsistence level of living, the Native Depart-
ment embarked on a policy of 'centralizing' the reserves (i.e.
demarcating land into fixed arable and grazing areas) and of
improving agricultural methods through trained 'demonstrators'
(56) . At first, the aim was to spread the agricultural demonstra-
tion net as widely as possible, to benefit the greatest number; but
by 1941, efforts began to be concentrated on the more efficient
producers, who also had favoured access to the best land. The
result was the emergence of a small and elite class of 'master
farmers' who were responsible for the major portion of African cash
crop production (57).
(ill) A complex price control system ensured that all African crop sales
) would subserve European needs. Under the_Maize Control and the
Beef Bounty and Levy Acts of the Thirties, levies were imposed on
African Maize and cattle sales, and the levy incomes used to sub-
sidize the maize and beef export losses of European producers.
The actual manner of subsidization involved some highly complicated pieces
of legislation which are too long to explain in a paper of this nature.
The effects of the levy system/ however, may briefly be outlined as
follows:
(a) Since the maize levy was payable by traders handling African maize,
the effect was to reduce opportunities for speculation by these so-
called 'trader-producers', and to convert 'commercial capital'
(as represented by profits on maize trading) into 'production capital1
(as represented by subsidies to European growers) .
(b) Exporters of chilled beef (called 'chiller-producers'), along with
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farmers needing cheap rations for their labourers (called 'farm-
consumers ') were permitted to buy African maize at less than the
Local Fixed Price, but for this privilege, they also had to pay a
levy, which represented a further source of income for. subsidizing
large-scale exporters (58). (The price paid to the African, plus
the levy, worked out at about 1/- to 1/6 less than the Local price
of some 9/- a bag during the Thirties).
(c) Chiller-producers received a further benefit, in the form of beef
'bounties* payable on exports, the bounty income being raised by
a levy on all stock slaughtered, both African and European. In
theory, any stock owner, whatever his race, was entitled to export
bounties; but since these exports were of high-quality European
origin, low-grade^African producers were, in effect, being made to
^ subsidize Europeans through payment of a levy for which they
received nothing back in return (59) .
(d) The beef levy was.payable by butchers who, in order to minimize its
impact, preferred to buy only the best quality African stock. For
instance: since the levy was the same, irrespective of the weight
of the beast, a butcher naturally preferred buying a single beast
of, say, 1000 lbs for which the levy was 10/-, than two or three
beasts totalling the same weight, for which he would be liable to
pay 20/- or 30/-.
This, in turn, led to the accumulation in the reserves of poorer
quality African stock which could not be sold, contributing in its
turn, to overstocking and a decline in stock quality (60).
(e> Both trader-producers and butchers passed on their levy deductions
J to the African by offering lower prices. Since the levies were
flat charges, irrespective of distances from the market, African
producers furthest from marketing outlets received the lowest prices.
The effect was to discourage the growing of maize in remote areas
which, under Depression circumstances, is what the government and
farmers wanted (61).
(f) From 1940 onwards, however, European producers were once again in a
position to export profitably. So the levy system was altered, to
restimulate African production in remote areas. Levies previously
used for subsidizing Europeans, were now used to subsidize the trans-
port costs of remote-area growers, so that all Africans would receive
the same price, irrespective of distance from the market. In effect,
efficient African producers were made to subsidize the less efficient,
the aim being to achieve an overall increase in African production,
in order to meet local needs which Whites were no longer interested
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in supplying. At the same time, income from levies was also
used for improving and expanding marketing facilities in the
reserves, and in order to raise the maximum amount of income for
this purpose, levies were imposed on other crops as well (62) ,
such as sorghum, groundnuts, beans, and small grains.
In these ways, the state was able to bring the African in as a supplier of
local needs, thereby enabling the European producer to concentrate his
main efforts on export markets. That the state had no small measure of
success, is born out by the fact that by 1950, Africans were accounting
for 97 per cent of the country's groundnut production (needed for the
vegetable oil manufacturing industry), 65 per cent of beef, 57 per cent
of wheat, and 54 per cent of maize (63).
(iv) Finally, the state" rationalized and institutionalized the time-
' honoured habit of speculating in African cattle. The Cold Storage
Commission, set up in 1938, acted as a residual buyer of all eligible
slaughter and non-slaughter stock in the reserves, the non-slaughter /
stock (comprising about a third of the total purchased) then being
placed on agreement with European farmers, who fattened them up and
took a profit on their improved condition when they delivered them,
in due course, to the Commission's abattoirs.
At the same time, the beef levy made way for a slightly more subtle
form of subsidizing European beef exporters : in guaranteeing prices
for slaughter cattle, the top grades of meat were fixed at a level
which involved the CSC in losses on both local and export sales; on
the other hand, producer prices of the lower grades, comprising all
\ of the African output, were manipulated to allow the Commission to
make an offsetting profit (64). The technique was not dissimilar
to that used by the Maize Control Board up to 1940, when high prices
paid to Europeans, Involved the Board in losses which it offset by -
>
the profits earned by direct buying and selling of African maize,
supplemented by the levies (65).
In overall terms, it will thus be seen that the agrarian capitalist structure
in Rhodesia was sustained by transforming and integrating the peasant mode
of production into an overall system of exploitation. The exploitative
structure was supported and reinforced by the penetration of capitalism
into the African peasant sector itself, to produce a labour-employing class
of 'master farmers' and 'irrigation plotholders1 on the one hand; a class
of self-supporting 'co-operators' in the middle (comprising about 30 per
cent of all African farmers in 1950); and a majority of 'marginalized1 /
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peasants at the other end of the scale, who were forced to supplement their
farming incomes by the custom of 'Mariksha* (i.e. by working for other
Africans), or by offering their labour services to Europeans (66).
This process of differentiation among the peasantry was a natural conse-
quence of the state's 'Native Development* policy, of which the 1953 Land
Husbandry Act was the supreme expression (67). But destocking programmes
in the Forties, which hit small stock-owners hardest (68), and increasingly
excessive demands for 'lobola1 in the marriage custom, along with the
inclination, of chiefs to allocate land to favourites (69), also played
their part in concentrating wealth into fewer and fewer hands.
In conclusion, capitalism and capitalistic growth was a function both of
the •backwardness1 and 'dependent development' of the peasant sector.
********************
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